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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Overcoming Operational Challenges to Ebola Case
Investigation in Sierra Leone
Samuel T Boland,a,b Erin Polich,b Allison Connolly,b Adam Hoar,b Tom Sesay,c Anh-Minh A Tranb
Deficiencies in transportation and communication, low frontline staff morale, and mistrust among
communities, among other operational challenges, greatly limited Ebola case investigation in Sierra Leone.
Recommendations for future outbreaks: (1) timely compensation for frontline staff, (2) context-appropriate
transportation and communication resources, (3) systematic data collection, storage, and retrieval systems,
(4) sound linkages between frontline staff and communities, (5) daily meetings between frontline staff and
epidemiologists, (6) clear and appropriate operational chain of command, and (7) political and funding
support to operational agencies.
ABSTRACT
The Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic that hit West Africa in 2013 was the worst outbreak of EVD in recorded history.
While much has been published regarding the international and national-level EVD responses, there is a dearth of litera-
ture on district-level coordination and operational structures, successes, and failures. This article seeks to understand how
the EVD response unfolded at the district level, namely the challenges to operationalizing EVD surveillance over the course
of the outbreak in Port Loko and Kambia districts of Sierra Leone. We present here GOAL Global’s understanding of the
fundamental challenges to case investigation operations during the EVD response, including environmental and infrastruc-
tural, sociocultural, and political and organizational challenges, with insight complemented by a survey of 42 case inves-
tigators. Major challenges included deficiencies in transportation and communication resources, low morale and fatigue
among case investigators, mismanagement of data, mistrust among communities, and leadership challenges. Without
addressing these operational challenges, technical surveillance solutions are difficult to implement and hold limited rele-
vance, due to the poor quality and quantity of data being collected. The low prioritization of operational needs came at a
high cost. To mediate this, GOAL addressed these operational challenges by acquiring critical transportation and commu-
nication resources to facilitate case investigation, including vehicles, boats, fuel, drivers, phones, and closed user groups;
addressing fatigue and low morale by hiring more case investigators, making timely payments, arranging for time off,
and providing meals and personal protective equipment; improving data tracking efforts through standard operating pro-
cedures, training, and mentorship to build higher-quality case histories and make it easier to access information; strength-
ening trust in communities by ensuring familiarity and consistency of case investigators; and improving operational
leadership challenges through meetings and regular coordination, establishing an active surveillance strategy in Port
Loko, and conducting an after-action review. Resolving or addressing these challenges was of primary importance, and
requisite for the implementation of technical epidemiological complements to EVD case investigation.
INTRODUCTION
The West African Ebola virus disease (EVD) epi-demic began in Meliandou, Guinea, in December
2013, before spreading to Liberia and Sierra Leone in
March and May 2014, respectively. By July 2014, EVD
had spread beyond containment, and on August
8, 2014, theWorld Health Organization (WHO) declared
a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern.”1
While there is new literature on the scale of the out-
break, international-level failures, and EVD clinical
features and transmission chains to help inform and con-
textualize these numbers, there is a dearth of literature
on the operational details of the EVD response at the dis-
trict level in Sierra Leone.2 These details include day-to-
day activities and the difficulties faced whenmounting a
response to a large-scale outbreak in resource-limited
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settings. This article attempts to help fill this gap,
drawing on the authors’ collective 64 months
of experience with the EVD response efforts in
Sierra Leone. Specifically, we discuss case investi-
gation operations in Port Loko and Kambia dis-
tricts of Sierra Leone.
Emergency bylaws enacted in August 2014 re-
quired the investigation of all deaths and
cases of sickness, among other exceptional legal
demands.3 Fulfilling this requirement and effec-
tively managing the EVD outbreak required a
well-trained and capacitated disease surveillance
structure to conduct the following components:
 Case investigation: Conduct in-person ass-
essments of all persons reported ill or deceased
to determine if they met the case definition
for suspected EVD, which is decided based on
the confluence of 15 possible symptoms and
history of EVD contact. Refer suspected cases
to EVD treatment centers. Document all known
contacts of the suspected EVD case and search
for all missing contacts.
 Dead body swabbing: Using oral swab speci-
mens, test all dead bodies for post-mortem EVD
before burial. If specimen tests EVD-positive,
conduct follow-up investigation and contact
tracing.
 Contact tracing: Monitor anyone who has
direct contact with an individual with EVD for
signs and symptoms of the virus during the
21-day incubation period. Note that the term
“contact tracing” in the Sierra Leonean context
refers to the monitoring of known contacts,
rather than elicitation and location of previ-
ously unknown contacts.
EVD surveillance requires all 3 of these
complementary and co-dependent components;
however, this manuscript focuses on the first
component—case investigation and specifically
its operational needs.
In October 2014, the National Ebola Response
Centre (NERC) was created to provide a central,
coordinated response to EVD at the national
level.4 Corresponding District Ebola Response
Centres (DERCs), responsible for local EVD
response operations, rolled out to the country’s
13 districts shortly thereafter.5 DERCswere staffed
by the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, the
British Armed Forces, the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) and the UK
Stabilisation Unit, the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), the respective dis-
trict medical officer (DMO) and members of their
district health management team (DHMT), NGOs,
and several United Nations agencies, including the
Mission for Ebola Emergency Response andWHO.
However, even with this structure in place,
conducting case investigation, dead body swab-
bing, and contact tracing was an enormous
effort considering the scale of the outbreak. Sierra
Leone has high levels of all-cause morbidity and
mortality rates,6 and EVD presents many clinical
similarities to endemic diseases like Lassa fever
and malaria, the latter alone accounting for
50% of health facility outpatient visits.7 Indeed,
by late 2014, Port Loko district experienced one
of the highest EVD caseloads in the country, with
nearly 100 laboratory-confirmed cases per week.8
The high burden of cases, requiring daily
investigation, demanded substantial logistical
resources and an operational framework—both
of which were lacking in the earliest stages of
the outbreak—and DERCs remained unable to
contain the rapid spread of EVD. Delays in
scaling up an international public health emer-
gency response—for which there was little
precedence—and a heavy focus on providing
technical epidemiological support rather than
operational and logistical support, exacerbated
these challenges.
Rapid field epidemiology training byWHO and
the CDC in late 2014 developed a much-needed
cadre of Sierra Leonean case investigators (also
referred to in-country as district surveillance offi-
cers), complemented by a cohort of expatriate
WHO and CDC epidemiologists. However, opera-
tional support to facilitate their work during the
height of the outbreak was still insufficient. EVD
case investigation quality and efficiency thus
remained insufficient through 2014. In Port Loko
district during the month of December 2014, 22%
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of confirmed EVD cases were found dead at
the time of investigation, only 26% of confirmed
EVD cases had a known source case, and the per-
centage of confirmed EVD cases previously identi-
fied as EVD contacts was a mere 15%.9
METHODS
In December 2014, the Port Loko DERC reques-
ted NGO support for EVD surveillance from the
Ebola Response Consortium, an NGO consor-
tium in Sierra Leone led by the International
Rescue Committee. GOAL Global thus began
supporting EVD surveillance in Port Loko in
January 2015, with DFID funding. The same
request was made in Kambia in March 2015, with
GOAL support beginning in April 2015. What fol-
lows are the challenges encountered in conduct-
ing EVD case investigation in Port Loko and
Kambia, and the work of GOAL in collaboration
with various DERC and DHMT stakeholders to
address and effectively operationalize EVD sur-
veillance activities in these 2 districts. A summary
of challenges and interventions is presented in the
Table.
This insight draws from our experiences
working in the EVD response, as well as a survey
of 42 Port Loko and Kambia case investigators
conducted by 2 of the authors in December
2015. The University of Chicago Social and
Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board
reviewed and approved the survey.
We acknowledge the following limitations of
this analysis: All data presented here were official
data, or data collected by the authors themselves
during the response, with all efforts made to
portray an accurate picture. However, data quality
is admittedly limited due to the crisis conditions of
the EVD response. Additionally, this article repre-
sents the viewpoints of a limited number of pro-
fessionals working in Port Loko and Kambia
districts of Sierra Leone during this time—only
several among thousands of national staff and
many tens of international responders who
worked in these districts during the outbreak.
CHALLENGES TO CONDUCTING EVD CASE
INVESTIGATION
Environmental and Infrastructural
Challenges
Case investigator transportation presented a sub-
stantial challenge to EVD surveillance. In Port
Loko and Kambia, only 7 and 3 vehicles, respec-
tively, were available for case investigation as of
December 2015 to cover an average of
43.3 daily alerts of sickness and death in Port
Loko and 8.1 in Kambia,10 among a total popula-
tion of 900,000 people over a total area of
8,827 square kilometers.11,12 This created major
logistical challenges to response capacity.
In addition to the challenge presented by
lack of vehicles, both Port Loko and Kambia have
poor-quality unpaved roads and a complicated
latticework of riverine areas. Accessibility difficul-
ties are exacerbated during the rainy season
fromMay to September, when the 2 districts each
receive between 2 and 4 meters of rain.13 Poorly
maintained and poor-quality vehicles were inad-
equate for such harsh conditions and prevented
timely and efficient case investigation when they
broke down or could not navigate roads. A lack of
reliable fuel supply further hampered case investi-
gation efforts.
Severe communication challenges also imp-
eded case investigation. Deficiencies in Sierra
Leone’s telecommunications infrastructure meant
it was often difficult for communities to raise sick-
ness and death alerts, particularly in rural areas.
As such, the flow of information necessary for
EVD surveillance was often limited at its point of
origin.
However, if communities raised an alert, there
was no guarantee that a case investigator would
successfully locate the alert, as the reported loca-
tions were often unspecific and investigators
often lacked phone credit or found themselves
out of network coverage to call for clarification.
Additionally, case investigators often failed to
communicate important information back to the
In Sierra Leone, case investigators had to navigate unpaved roads and
riverine areas.
GOALGlobal
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TABLE. Challenges and Solutions to Conducting Ebola Virus Disease Case Investigation, Sierra Leone
Type Challenges Solutions
Environmental and Infrastructural
Transportation  Lack of vehicles, poorly maintained low-quality
vehicles, and lack of fuel posed challenges for case
investigators to cover daily alerts of sickness and
death in the 2 districts.
 Poor-quality unpaved roads, riverine areas, and
the rainy season from May to September further
complicated response efforts.
 GOAL collaborated with DFID, NERC, WHO, and
other NGOs to provide high-quality off-road
vehicles, along with fuel, drivers, and other
logistical support.
 GOAL rented 12 vehicles in Port Loko and Kambia,
and advocated with WHO and NERC to provide
additional vehicles.
 GOAL requested authorization and funding from
DFID for Catholic Relief Services in Port Loko and
GOAL in Kambia to fuel the additional vehicles.
 GOAL advocated and helped facilitate the
acquisition of boats from the Republic of Sierra
Leone Armed Forces to facilitate access to riverine
areas in Kambia.
Communication  Deficiencies in telecommunications infrastructure
made it difficult for communities to raise sickness
and death alerts, particularly in rural areas.
 Case investigators could not reliably locate alerts
and often failed to communicate important
information due to unspecific reported locations,
lack of phone credit, or unreliable network
coverage.
 GOAL distributed cellular phones, phone credit,
and satellite phones to case investigators and their
coordinators in the DHMT and DERC.
 GOAL provided closed user groups to all case
investigation teams and selected individuals in the
DERC, enabling free unlimited calling between case
investigators, their supervisors, and epidemiology
teams in WHO and CDC.
Data quality and
management
 Mismanagement of investigation materials posed a
challenge to locating specific information, tracking
efforts, and building case histories.
 Discrepancies occurred at the field and district
levels, and no formal filing mechanism existed for
completed case investigation forms.
 Inconsistency in naming conventions, spelling, and
characterization of residence made matching
documents difficult.
 GOAL developed standard operating procedures
in collaboration with all surveillance stakeholders.
 Standard operating procedures ensured that case
investigation forms were collected, stored, and
organized in a retrievable manner.
 GOAL hired data managers in both the Port Loko
and Kambia DERC to file and immediately digitize
this information in real time.
 WHO established an after-action review in Port
Loko in collaboration with GOAL, CDC, and the
DHMT to review case investigation information and
data at the end of each day.
Personal safety
and fatigue
 Case investigators were unable to eat during their
long work day due to dangers of purchasing
food from high-risk communities, stigma from
communities who feared them, a lack of personal
funds, and insufficient time.
 GOAL immediately provided daily take-away
breakfast and lunch to all case investigators.
 Case investigators received hand sanitizer and
personal protective equipment to help prevent EVD
infection, and rain gear allowed for easier
movement of personnel during the rainy season.
Sociocultural
Community trust  A lack of community trust in response staff and
enormous stigma resulted in difficulties conducting
case investigations, lack of truthful information, and
sometimes violence.
 Case investigators rarely returned to the same
communities each day and generally did not work
in their own communities.
 GOAL assigned a dedicated team for each of
Port Loko’s and Kambia’s chiefdoms to ensure
familiarity and consistency.
 To the extent possible, case investigators were
assigned to work in their chiefdom of origin.
Continued
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TABLE. Continued
Type Challenges Solutions
Traditional healers  A lack of trust in facility-based health care and fear
of nosocomial infections drove many to seek health
care from traditional healers.
 Despite the fact that traditional healers were legally
banned from practicing and required to report
cases of illness, many people disregarded the
bylaws despite fears of punitive measures.
 Cases of sickness and death went unreported, and
traditional healers fueled new EVD clusters when
they contracted the disease from their patients.
 DERC stakeholders, including GOAL, attempted to
formally involve traditional healers as public health
agents in the EVD response. However, due to the
illegality of their work under the national bylaws,
there was strong political hesitation to permit
activity that appeared to legitimize the trade. As
such, further efforts to include traditional healers
were not pursued.
Political and Organizational
Management
structures
 In Port Loko, GOAL became the lead operational
agency and coordinator of the surveillance pillar.
However, in Kambia, WHO continued leading
surveillance, directing operational activities, and
overseeing logistical needs despite not controlling
operational resources. Crucial operational
adjustments in Port Loko were therefore not easily
implemented in Kambia.
 No single organization was identified as the lead
agency for case investigators, and therefore no
single point of advocacy existed to resolve their
needs, complicating the resolution of problems.
 Leadership challenges in Kambia were addressed
to some degree through relationship building and
regular coordination with technical leads and DERC
management.
 GOAL, WHO, and CDC developed an active sur-
veillance strategy in Port Loko to address the high
proportion of EVD cases identified post-mortem or
with no known source case.
Human resources  The lack of sufficient case investigators and the
work fatigue that resulted were among the biggest
challenges facing case investigators.
 Funding constraints and a perceived lack of need at
the NERC resulted in a national directive that pre-
vented hiring new surveillance staff.
 GOAL advocated with DFID and NERC to bring in
additional human resources.
 The DHMT, GOAL, WHO, and CDC trained the
new case investigators.
 Mentorship in the field reinforced the training.
 A rotation system was implemented to provide time
off to address surveillance efficiency, quality, and
case investigator work fatigue.
Compensation  Case investigators averaged more than a month of
missed pay per person and could sometimes not
afford to buy food or pay rent.
 At the national level, case investigators were
sometimes incorrectly relegated to lower pay
categories and clerical errors resulted in their
removal from payroll.
 Threats of strikes were frequent and morale was
extremely low.
 Resolving case investigator salary issues was a
protracted and complicated process.
 Initially, NERC paid all case investigators, with
funding from the World Bank.
 Ultimately, GOAL secured DFID funding and NERC
permission to pay all case investigators directly in
both districts beginning in July 2015.
Inter-pillar
coordination
 Many of the 11 vertical pillars of operation at
DERCs performed complementary work.
 Horizontal integration and cooperation between
pillars was profoundly challenging, which often
resulted in a lack of effective cooperation between
them.
 Meetings were established to create horizontal
linkages between the pillars in Port Loko in January
2015 and in Kambia in April 2015.
 GOAL attempted to reinforce horizontal
communication by developing an EVD response
framework, which was not fully realized because it
was developed late in the response.
Abbreviations: CDC, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; DERC, District Ebola Response Centre; DFID, UK Department for International
Development; DHMT, district health management team; EVD, Ebola virus disease; NERC, National Ebola Response Centre; WHO, World Health
Organization.
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DERC because of these same reasons. The delay in
both accessing cases and reporting on them due
to telecommunications challenges resulted in
protracted and haphazard case investigations and
follow-up.
Data management of investigation materials
from the field and within the DERC also posed a
challenge to effectively tracking and building case
histories, with discrepancies occurring both in the
field and at the DERC. No formal filingmechanism
existed for completed case investigation forms,
whichwere in hard copy only andwere often scat-
tered across multiple DERC offices. Locating spe-
cific information was therefore challenging and
time-consuming; this was further complicated by
Sierra Leonean naming conventions, variations
in spelling, and characterization of residence,
which made matching documents exceptionally
difficult. The need for a systemized retrievalmech-
anismwas crucial because an EVD case was gener-
ally not laboratory-confirmed on the day it was
investigated, when the case investigation form
was completed. As such, if a positive case result
returned from the laboratory, locating the initial
case investigation form from a previous day often
proved difficult. A case investigation form dupli-
cated from memory usually resulted in a lower-
quality case report.
Lastly, case investigators were unable to eat
during their long work day due to dangers of pur-
chasing food from high-risk communities, stigma
from communities who feared EVD responders, a
lack of personal funds to do so, and insufficient
time. Case investigators complained of fatigue
due to insufficient nutrition, which resulted in
limiting work efficiency and rigor.
Sociocultural Challenges
Sociocultural challenges further limited EVD
surveillance efficacy. Enormous stigma against
EVD response workers and a powerful lack of
trust in EVD response staff resulted in difficulties
generating high-quality case investigations and
sometimes resulted in violence against case inves-
tigators.14 Due to insufficient human resources
and logistical capacity, case investigators rarely
returned to the same communities each day, but
instead responded to alerts ad hoc. Nor was it
standard procedure for case investigators to
operate within their own community. Thus, com-
munities often regarded them with suspicion as
outsiders. For instance, in April 2015, community
members chased case investigators out of a remote
village in Kambia and threatened them with
machetes when they were dispatched to investi-
gate an alert.
When case investigators in Port Loko and
Kambia were asked to rank the challenges
they considered most significant to their work,
77% included “community trust in surveillance”
as 1 of their top 3 challenges (Figure 1). This lack
of trust led to lower-quality investigations, as
communities were reticent to provide truthful in-
formation to case investigators.
Additionally, a lack of trust in facility-based
health care and fear of nosocomial infections
drove many to seek health care from traditional
healers. While traditional healers were legally
banned from practicing under the emergency
bylaws and required to report any cases of illness,3
many disregarded the bylaws and continued
treating patients without integration with EVD
surveillance or response activities. As such, many
instances of sickness and death remained unre-
ported, and the high-risk population of traditional
healers fueled new EVD clusters when they
contracted EVD from their patients. Traditional
healers and those with connections to them often
were not transparent with case investigators for
fear of punitive measures for violating the emer-
gency bylaws.
Political and Organizational Challenges
Some of the greatest challenges that faced EVD
surveillance in Port Loko and Kambia were politi-
cal and organizational challenges. WHO district
offices were intended to provide technical support
and offer an advisory role to DERC operations. In
the early days of the response and in the absence
of widespread external support, WHO also pro-
vided operational and logistical support for many
DERC activities. This engendered a reliancewithin
the DERC onWHO as both an advisory and opera-
tional body, despite the WHO Assistant Director-
General Dr. Bruce Aylward attesting that the
“organization . . . was not designed to be an opera-
tional field-based organization . . . play[ing] such a
role.”15
When GOAL began supporting Port Loko
case investigation in January 2015, it was
quickly identified as the lead operational agency
and coordinated the surveillance pillar (1 of 11
organizational pillars of operation within DERCs),
collaborating closely with WHO and CDC as
technical leads. In Kambia, due to a different
response trajectory and political climate, WHO
maintained coordination leadership of the surveil-
lance pillar, directed operational activities, and
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oversaw logistical needs despite not controlling
operational resources. The difference in these
2 management structures meant that operational
adjustments in Port Loko identified as crucial
and effective (see Interventions) were not easily
implemented in Kambia, a political challenge
that frequently limited response efficacy and
efficiency.
This management structure of the surveillance
pillar in Kambia contributed to challenges with
coordination. No single organization was identi-
fied as the lead agency for case investigators, and
therefore no single point of advocacy existed to
resolve their needs, limiting the resolution of vari-
ous identified and serious problems. In contrast,
these concerns were addressed more efficiently in
Port Loko, wheremanagement and organizational
responsibilities were more clearly delineated.
Human resources, particularly the lack of suffi-
cient case investigators and the work fatigue that
resulted, were among the biggest challenges facing
EVD case investigation in both Port Loko and
Kambia. Throughout much of the outbreak, case
investigators worked 7 days a week, without
scheduled time off or periods of rest. From an
operational standpoint, this was necessary as
human resources were badly lacking. However,
21% of case investigators surveyed considered
work fatigue as 1 of the 3 biggest challenges to
their work (Figure 1). Funding constraints and a
perceived lack of need at the NERC resulted in a
national directive that prevented the hiring of
new surveillance staff after March 2015. This
became problematic, particularly in Kambia
when GOAL and the DERC leadership identified
an immediate need to increase the number of
investigators from 3 to 9 in April 2015 to effec-
tively address the persistent EVD caseload in
Kambia and the high risk of EVD importation
from neighboring Guinea.16
Timely compensation was considered to be
another major challenge by case investigators:
53% of case investigators included compensation
as 1 of the 3 biggest challenges to their work
(Figure 1). When asked “What are some things
NERC could have done better?” 88% of case
investigators listed late or non-compensation.
A letter dated February 16, 2015, from the Port
Loko DMO to NERC listed a backlog of 92.4 mil-
lion SLL (approximately US$18,500) among the
district’s 53 case investigators, averaging more
than 1 month of missed pay per person, dating
back to October 2014 (Alfred Kamara, written
communication, February 16, 2015). These
FIGURE 1. Challenges Identified by Case Investigators as Most Significanta to EVD Case Investigation, Port Loko and
Kambia Districts, Sierra Leone (N=42)
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payments were not distributed until May 2015. In
a low-income country where personal savings
are nominal, case investigators sometimes com-
plained that they could not afford to buy food or
pay rent due to lack of payment. Additional issues
at the national level included erroneous relegation
of case investigators to lower pay categories and
clerical errors that removed personnel from pay-
roll. Threats of strikes were frequent, and morale
was extremely low.
Lastly, the organizational design of the DERC
itself challenged collaborative work. DERCs were
organized by 11 vertical pillars of operation, each
with its own function andmanagement.Many pil-
lars performed complementary work; however,
horizontal integration and cooperation was pro-
foundly challenging, as doing so could appear to
encroach on identified management responsibil-
ity. This often resulted in a lack of effective cooper-
ation between pillars.
INTERVENTIONS TO ADDRESS
OPERATIONAL EVD CASE INVESTIGATION
CHALLENGES
Without addressing operational challenges, tech-
nical surveillance solutions are difficult to imple-
ment and hold limited relevance, due to the poor
quality and quantity of data being collected to
direct more technical and strategic solutions. In
the early months of the Port Loko and Kambia
DERC-led responses, epidemiological analysis
was prioritized over operational needs. This lower
prioritization came at a high opportunity cost,
leading to a decrease in operational capacity and
efficacy of interventions intended to resolve
challenges detrimental to case investigation. To
mediate this, GOAL addressed these operational
challenges as outlined below, corresponding to
the aforementioned categories of challenges.
Environmental and Infrastructural
Interventions
First, an intervention was necessary to provide
case investigators with the basic resources they
required to continue working. GOAL immediately
provided daily take-away breakfast and lunch to
all case investigators to prevent hunger, fatigue,
and EVD exposure from purchasing food in high-
risk communities and to avoid stigma faced in
communities during investigations. Case investi-
gators received hand sanitizer and appropriate
personal protective equipment to help prevent
EVD infection, and rain gear allowed for easier
movement of personnel in flooded areas. Case
investigator morale improved rapidly as a
result.
To address transportation issues, GOAL
collaborated with DFID, NERC, WHO, and other
NGOs to provide high-quality off-road vehicles
to case investigation teams in both Port Loko
and Kambia, along with the requisite fuel,
drivers, and other logistical support. GOAL rented
12 vehicles in Port Loko and Kambia, and advo-
cated with WHO and NERC to provide additional
vehicles for case investigation. GOAL asked DFID
for authorization and funding for Catholic Relief
Services as the district fleet management agency
in Port Loko and GOAL in Kambia to source and
provide fuel for the additional vehicles. This
allowed the assignment of at least 1 case investiga-
tion team to each of the 2 district’s chiefdoms.
Boats were needed to facilitate access to river-
ine areas, which were successfully acquired
from the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed
Forces. These measures improved the timeli-
ness, quality, and efficiency of case investiga-
tion activities in areas that were previously
difficult or impossible to access.
GOAL distributed cellular phones, phone
credit, and satellite phones, where necessary, to
case investigators and their coordinators in the
DHMT and DERC, to ensure the timely com-
munication of information between the DERC
and the field. Closed user groups were provided
to all case investigation teams and selected indi-
viduals in the DERC, enabling free unlimited
calling between case investigators, their supervi-
sors, and epidemiology teams in WHO and
CDC. These measures also facilitated more
timely requests, and ultimately, responsiveness
from case investigators to the DERC for resour-
ces such as the dispatch of ambulance or burial
teams.
WHO established an after-action review in
Port Loko in collaboration with GOAL, CDC,
and the DHMT in January 2015, to review case
investigation information and data at the end
of each day. The after-action review provided
an opportunity for ongoing training as epidemiol-
ogists reviewed cases with case investigators
and provided guidance on how to improve subse-
quent investigations. The after-action review
also ensured all surveillance information and
case investigation forms from the field were sys-
tematically returned to the DERC each day, as
well as provided a daily forum to raise operational
concerns. This effective measure was immediately
implemented by GOAL and other surveillance
Late payments,
non-
compensation,
and clerical errors
related to pay
resulted in threats
of strike and
extremely low
morale among
case investigators.
GOAL
collaboratedwith
other agencies to
provide high-
quality off-road
vehicles, fuel,
drivers, and
logistical support,
as well as boats
for riverine areas.
Case investigators
and coordinators
in the DHMTand
DERC received
phones, phone
credit, satellite
phones, and
closed user groups
to ensure timely
communication.
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pillar partners in Kambia when their support
began in April 2015.
Challenges surrounding data quality and
coordination were also addressed by developing
various standard operating procedures in collabo-
ration with all surveillance stakeholders, includ-
ing the basic structure of alert response by case
investigators (Figure 2). Standard operating pro-
cedures were also put in place to ensure case
investigation forms were collected, stored, and
organized in a retrievable manner. All informa-
tion was consolidated in an organized filing
cabinet. GOAL hired data managers in both the
Port Loko and Kambia DERCs to file and immedi-
ately digitize this information in real time. This
allowed for timely retrieval and communication
of surveillance data to relevant stakeholders
and EVD response workers, including case
investigators.
Sociocultural Interventions
Assigning 1 dedicated team for each of Port Loko’s
and Kambia’s chiefdoms enabled familiarity and
FIGURE 2. Flow Chart of Ebola Disease Alert Response, Sierra Leone
Abbreviations: CM, case management; EVD, Ebola virus disease; MCD, meets case definition.
Notes: A “117 call” is the national EVD alert hotline, the mechanism by which most occurrences of sickness and death were reported to the District Ebola
Response Centres (DERCs). “EHealth” is an NGO that supported the DERC. This flow chart is part of the standard operating procedures developed by
Samuel Boland on behalf of GOAL.
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consistency between communities and the case
investigators working within them. To the extent
possible, case investigators were assigned to work
in their chiefdomof origin. As a result, community
trust in case investigators improved in both dis-
tricts, and case investigators could thus be in
regular conversation with local leaders such as
paramount and village chiefs, teachers, health fa-
cility staff, and traditional healers. Additionally,
data quality increased as case investigators became
experts in specific EVD cases and transmission
chains. This occurred because of the geographic
consistency of case investigator deployment and
the increased understanding of local cultural con-
texts surrounding a particular transmission chain.
Several DERC stakeholders, including GOAL
in Port Loko in June 2015, attempted to formally
involve traditional healers as public health
agents in the EVD response. However, despite
the potential efficacy of their inclusion, due to the
illegality of traditional healers’ work under the
national bylaws, there was strong political hesita-
tion to permit activity that appeared to legitimize
the trade.17 As such, further efforts to include tra-
ditional healers in the EVD response were not
pursued.
Political and Organizational Interventions
Additional human resources were brought in to
address the issue of work fatigue in both Port
Loko and Kambia. GOAL advocated for these
additional case investigators with DFID and
NERC, who agreed to increase case investigators
in both districts. In July 2015, case investigators
increased from 25 to 65 in Port Loko, and from
3 to 9 in April 2015 in Kambia— with a further
increase from 9 to 21 in July 2015.11,12 The num-
ber of case investigators is relative to the size of the
districts—Port Loko has an estimated population
of 550,000 and an area of 2,208 square miles split
among eleven chiefdoms, whereas Kambia has a
population of 350,000 and an area of 1,200 square
miles split among 7 chiefdoms. The DHMT, GOAL,
WHO, and CDC trained these new case investiga-
tors, and mentorship in the field reinforced the
formal training, resulting in improved data collec-
tion quality. As new case investigators became
operational, a rotation system was implemented
to provide time off. This helped address surveil-
lance efficiency, quality, and case investigator
work fatigue.
Resolving compensation issues for case inves-
tigators was a protracted and complicated process.
Initially, NERC paid all case investigators, with
funding from the World Bank. GOAL advocated
with NERC on behalf of case investigators, the vis-
ibility of which provided some comfort to case
investigators. Ultimately, to alleviate ongoing
challenges surrounding payments, GOAL secured
DFID funding and NERC permission to pay all case
investigators directly in both districts beginning in
July 2015. Direct and timely payment consider-
ably improved case investigator morale.
Inter-pillar coordination meetings were estab-
lished to create horizontal linkages between the
pillars in Port Loko in January 2015, and in
Kambia in April 2015. GOAL attempted to rein-
force horizontal communication by developing
an EVD response framework (Figure 3). Unfort-
unately, this structure was not fully realized in
either district as it was developed late in the
response. However, responses to future emergen-
cies should consider similar coordination mecha-
nisms that encourage both horizontal and vertical
communication.
Leadership challenges in Kambia were miti-
gated to some degree through relationship build-
ing and regular coordination with technical
leads and DERC management; however, case
investigation management remained fragmented.
To address the high proportion of EVD cases iden-
tified post-mortem or with no known source case,
GOAL, WHO, and CDC developed an active sur-
veillance strategy in Port Loko, which began in
April 2015. This strategy targeted operational
resources based on epidemiologic analysis of
areas that were underreporting—an ideal conver-
gence of operational and technical expertise.
DERC leadership in Kambia decided not to employ
this strategy as they considered it too difficult to
operationalize. Although similar interventions
Community members in Kambia, Sierra Leone, welcome case investigators
and their release from quarantine.
Case investigators
worked in
dedicated
chiefdoms to
ensure familiarity
and consistency,
which
strengthened trust
among
communities.
Case investigators
received training
andmentorship to
improve data
collection quality.
An EVD response
frameworkwas
established to
create linkages
between pillars,
but it was not fully
realized as it was
developed late in
the response.
Ebola Case Investigation in Sierra Leone www.ghspjournal.org
Global Health: Science and Practice 2017 | Volume 5 | Number 3 465
occurred in the 2 districts, analysis of alert data
from June 2015 to September 2015 (during
Operation Northern Push, an effort by the NERC
and DFID to eliminate EVD transmission from
Port Loko and Kambia), showed statistically sig-
nificant lower percentage increases in alerts in
Kambia.18
RECOMMENDATIONS
EVD case investigation in Port Loko and Kambia
districts of Sierra Leone faced numerous environ-
mental, infrastructural, sociocultural, political,
and organizational obstacles and difficulties.
GOAL’s intervention, beginning in January 2015
in Port Loko and April 2015 in Kambia, addressed
these issues to varying degrees of success in each
district.
While the focus on technical support is indis-
pensable in any outbreak, operational needs must
be addressed and structures established to ensure
the quality and systematic collection of surveil-
lance data, as well as its storage, organization,
retrievability, and communication. Without com-
prehensive and reliable data, effective technical
support is limited. In future outbreaks, all of the
following operational components must also be
addressed within a politically and organizationally
enabling environment:
 Ensure frontline staff receive timely compensa-
tion for and sufficient rest from their work, to
boost staff morale, efficiency, and safety.
 Provide sufficient and context-appropriate
transportation and communication resources,
to ensure effective communication between
field staff, their coordinators, and community
members.
 Establish systematic data collection, storage,
and retrieval systems, to ensure that any record
can be effectively and efficiently accessed.
 Create formal linkages between frontline staff
and the communities they work in to develop
trust between them, thus increasing staff safety
and investigation quality.
 Establish daily meetings between frontline staff
and epidemiologists to ensure information and
data quality and to provide opportunities for
daily mentorship and training.
FIGURE 3. GOAL Ebola Virus Disease Response Structure, Sierra Leone
Abbreviations: CEBS, community event-based surveillance; DC, District Coordinator; DMO, District Medical Officer; DO, District Officer.
Note: Developed by Samuel Boland on behalf of GOAL.
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 Identify clear and appropriate leadership for
operational chain of command.
 Give credence at all political and funding levels
to operational foundations.
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